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ABSTRACT
Various presence-based validation technologies exist that provide for the ability
add identity and presence validation to a laptop-based system.

However, these

technologies are primarily limited to computers (e.g., desktops and laptops) and do not
include location validation. There is a need to extend these capabilities to other devices
connected to a network and also to eliminate the need for a hardware-assisted solution.
There is also a need to offer network location to avoid any type of attack from devices that
are not connected to a local area network (LAN) or even to the same port. This proposal
provides a technique to ensure that a device/person is present at a location by observing
that the device/person performed an activity on-site, which can be observed by a trusted
third-party.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Current technologies that utilize a presence check of a device to provide
device/network security involve a user interaction but do not check/verify the network
location of the device. Further, current technologies do not utilize IP version 6 (IPv6)
capabilities.
This proposal provides a unique software security solution that provides for the
ability to check the presence of any network device, including device identity and device
location. In particular, the solution of this proposal ensures that a device/person is present
at a location by observing that the device/person performed an activity on-site that can be
observed by the third-party, for example, adding a link-local address in a network binding
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table and/or in router neighbor caches, and asking that trusted third-party whether the
activity was performed.
The solution is based on IPv6. For example, in a first step, a certificate is installed
in a device to be authenticated (e.g., via a soft token or other similar mechanism). This
first step (1) can be performed offline during a commissioning phase of the device. For a
second step (2), when an application running on a server needs to check the presence of
the device (identify and location), the application sends a request (including a generated
session key) to the IP address of the device. As referred to herein, the term "location" is
meant to refer to a network location (e.g., for access switch). Access switches are very
often geographically located (in a building, office, home, etc.).
For a third step (3), when receiving this request, the device builds a second IPv6
address using the auto-configuration capability and computes the Interface Identifier (IID)
part of the address by using the certificate and the key obtained from the server. The result
of this computation provides a topologically correct IPv6 address that could be installed in
the network. The server on its side performs the computation, so now both the device and
the server know this IPv6 address. According to the security requirement, this address will
have a specific lifetime. In one instance, the time for the computation performed by each
of the device and the server can also be introduced as an additional layer of security.
For a fourth step (4), the computed address is installed in the network. In a switch
fabric, it will be populated in the host table. In a standard LAN, it will use the regular IPv6
mechanism with Duplicate Address Detection (DAD). For a fifth step (5), the server or
application can now regularly check that the address is still present (e.g., by using an
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) PING). The fact that this address is valid and
installed in the network proves the presence and identity of the device.
In another instance, switch security functionality can be enhanced to also check that
the second IPv6 address is on the same port as the device address adding a location check
to this system. Other capabilities such as regular IP address checking, attack, IP address
removal, etc. may be provided by such switch security functionality. In some instances, if
needed and if 64-bits is not seen as a sufficient security level, a third IP address could be
generated adding another 64-bits to the address.
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Figure 1 below illustrates example details associated with an application of this
solution within a Software-Defined Access (SDA) network, including a Fabric Edge (FE)
switch and a centralized Host Table through which all IP addresses are known. In one
instance, the Host Table can be accessed using the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP).

Figure 1: Solution Application within an SDA Network
Consider a bootstrap sequence that can be performed via the SDA network of
Figure 1, as follows:
1. Host H1 establishes a session with the server that requires double
authentication.
2. The server generates the session key and sends it to the host H1.
3. The host computes an IPV6 address, IPK, (e.g., using Stateless Address
Auto-Configuration (SLAAC)) with a link-id built after a hash of the key.
The server does the same.
4. The host "registers" this address to the network (using Neighbor Discovery
(ND) registration), and simply checks for duplication (e.g., DAD).
5. In both cases, an ND packet is sent that the Fabric Edge, FE1, intercepts and
uses to push the IPK into the host table.
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6. The server queries the host table for IPK. If it is present, it means: (i) That
the host H1 received the key, and (ii) that the host is attached at the expected
location (FE1).
7. The host session can proceed.
It should be noted that only the host H1 can remove the address IPK (there is always
a location check before allowing a removal) and only H1 can add the address IPK (the key
was sent only to the host).
IPv6 has become the standard evolution of current networks. Almost all the
devices, including personal computers, laptops, mobile devices (e.g., utilizing 5G mobile
networks), etc. support IPv6. Further, industrial wireless networks, such as International
Society of Automation (ISA) protocol ISA100, utilizes IPv6. Additionally, the United
States government has issued a directive to move to all of their networks to "IPv6 only"
(not only dual stack) by 2025 (e.g., 80%).
IPv6 offers a huge address space and also utilizes DAD mechanisms as discussed
for the solution of this proposal. Thus, in the rare case of a duplicate address, the
duplication can be detected by the network/device and the device just asks the server to
generate a new session key to restart the process from the beginning, similar to SLAAC.
Thus, the solution of this proposal fits perfectly within the evolution of today's networks.
It should be noted, however, that while the solution described herein involves a
device running IPv6, the solution does not require the network to support IPv6 for routing,
etc. Rather, the IPv6 address set by the device application is pushed to the application's
point of attachment and become an opaque (cryptographic) token, which happen to be 128bits. From there, the token is installed in the host table and accessed. The token can be
accessed using IPv4 standards if a network has not enabled v6.
Although a similar solution could be provided in the IPv4 space, the limitation of
IPv4 in term of number of bits may be too restrictive for the average required security level.
Still, even if a device is not using IPv6 for an application's communication, the device can
forge an IPv6 address to support the solution of this proposal if the access network supports
IPv6.
Further, it should be noted that the authentication solution of this proposal does not
require a custom server to poll for the presence of the IP address regularly. Many popular

4
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/4423

6653
5

Wetterwald et al.: PRESENCE VALIDATION USING SECURED INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) ADDRESS

fabric-based networks involving a host table can utilize standard technologies to implement
the authentication solution of this proposal, such as LISP, NETCONF/YANG, Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP), etc.
In contrast to other authentication mechanisms, such as dot1x (.1x), it is noted that
while .1x offers a trusted/authenticated LAN network access mechanism, the solution of
this proposal provides more of an application-level authentication solution, which, in some
sense, may even also be above Virtual Private Network (VPN) solutions. In essence, the
solution of this proposal provides an application-to-application authentication solution.
In summary, the solution of this proposal provides for the ability to ensure that a
device/person is present at a location by observing that the device/person performed an
activity on-site, which can be observed by a trusted third-party. As one example, the
solution involves forming a link local IPv6 address with a cryptographic IID that only the
correct device can compute and observing that the address is present on link. For instance,
the trusted third-party can check that the address that is added is a link-local address in a
network binding table / router neighbor caches, and it is possible, at any time to, to ask the
trusted third-party whether the activity was performed and possibly to assert the presence
of the link local address by pinging the address.
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